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1FLEXIBLE CITIZENSHIP
FOR A GLOBAL SOCIETY
by
Bruno S. Frey
!
(University of Zurich)
Abstract
States are ill equipped to meet the challenges of a globalized world. The concept of citizenship
with its rights and obligations, including the allegiance owed, is too narrowly defined to exist
only between individuals and a state. Today, people identify with, and pay allegiance to, many
organizations beyond the state. This paper suggests that citizenship could be extended further and
be possible between individuals and quasi-governmental organizations, as well as non-
governmental organizations, such as churches, clubs, interest groups, functional organizations
and profit firms. Due to the larger set of types of citizenship individuals could choose from, their
preferences would be better fulfilled and, due to the competition for citizens induced among
organizations, the efficiency of public activity would be raised.
JEL Classification: H1, H4, H7
Keywords: Citizenship, Public Goods, Political Competition
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2I. INADEQUATE NATION STATES AND NEW CONCEPTS
We live in the age of the market. Whenever an economic or social problem arises,
the knee-jerk reaction is to ask for more market via privatization and deregulation.
The government is on the defensive. A standard demand is to run the government
as efficiently as private firms. Moreover, the globalization of economic activities
undermines many areas in which governments were traditionally active. “A race to
the bottom”, i.e. continuously falling tax rates and tax revenues due to the tax
competition between governments, is often seen as a real danger
1
.
At the same time, governments are in many ways as important as they were
throughout the 20
th
 century. A large and rising share of GNP is politically allocated,
mainly through the government’s redistribution (see e.g. Tanzi and Schuknecht
2000). It has been found that privatization needs governmental re-regulation,
globalization depends on rules enforced by governments, and the development of
transition economies urgently requires a well-functioning government.
Government, and public activity in general, is still of overriding importance, but the
existing institutionalized relationship between individuals and government is ill
equipped to cope with the problems of a global world. In particular, to be forced to
have the exclusive citizenship of one particular nation only, is inadequate for
internationally highly mobile persons such as is the case with many managers,
artists, academics, sportsmen and sportswomen. Moreover, multiple identities
going above and beyond nationality have become the rule. But the present system
                                                
1
  See e.g. Tanzi 1996, 2000. A theoretical survey of the theory of tax competition is given in
Wilson 1999. Quantitative evidence on globalization is extensively collected in Schulze and
Ursprung 1999. More general aspects of globalization are e.g. Rodrik 1997, Giddens 1999, or the
collection of articles in O’Meara, Mehlinger and Krain 2000.
3of citizenship in the nation state also violates the preferences of the “average”
person, who often identifies more with a lower level of government (e.g. their
particular region) or a higher level of government (e.g. Europe as a whole) rather
than with the national level. Even more fundamentally, people often identify more
with other organizations such as NGOs or even with particular firms rather than
with the nation of which they happen to be citizens.
Societies must find new ways to master the problems that lie ahead in living in an
increasingly globalized world. New forms have to be found for the governance of
the public sphere. The existing concepts of citizenship were devised in the 19
th
century in the wake of the French Revolution. The concept remained unchanged in
the 20
th
 century: citizens are the subjects of one nation.
This paper advances proposals for a new concept of citizenship designed to be
more suited to the public sphere in a global economy and society. The new concept
– it will be called COM, which stands for “Citizenship: Organizational and
Marginal” – will at first sight appear rather unorthodox, if not revolutionary,
compared to today’s citizenship. It will certainly meet with strong opposition from
politicians in power (who fear losing their monopoly power over what they often
still see as their “subjects”), as well as traditional marketeers (who cannot see why
governance of the public sphere should be improved, as everything can be
accomplished by the market). But the new concept of citizenship contains several
features which already exist in one form or another in reality. The proposal is based
on the New Institutional Economics and Modern Political Economy or Public
Choice (see e.g. Eggertsson 1990, Mueller 1989, 1997). The proposal goes beyond
positive analysis; it is clearly normative.
The proposal is diametrically opposed to what has become fashionable today,
namely to suggest extending the market to more and more areas. My proposal seeks
4to transfer a relationship typical for the governmental realm – namely citizenship
involving identification and commitment or intrinsic motivation – to a more general
social setting
2
.
Section II reviews the traditional concept of citizenship. The following section III
develops the idea of a generalized citizenship applicable well beyond the realm of
the nation state. The proposed citizenship is “Organizational”, in the sense that
individuals may become citizens not only of states but also of other organizations,
such as non-governmental institutions, non-profit organizations and even profit-
oriented firms. The proposed citizenship is moreover “Marginal” as it can be held
temporarily, may be multiple, and even partial, i.e. restricted to some functions
only. Section IV discusses the working of COM in terms of voluntary contracts
between individuals and organizations, and the interaction extending to include
many dimensions. The advantages of COM, compared to the existing form of
citizenship, are outlined in section V. In particular, the more adequate alignment of
primary identification and citizenship, and the induced increase in efficiency due to
strengthening competition, are pointed out. The claimed shortcomings of the new
concept of citizenship are the subject of section VI, among other things that it
unduly raises complexity, is unfeasible in principle, or will be blocked by political
resistance. Concluding remarks are offered in section VII.
                                                
2
  Instead of “empirialistic economics” (see Stigler 1984, Lazear 2000), i.e. introducing economic
concepts into other disciplines, a concept from another discipline is imported into economics.
This reverse movement is consistent with Hirshleifer’s (1985) claim that empirialist economics
runs into diminishing returns (see also Frey 2001).
5II. TRADITIONAL CITIZENSHIP
The concept of citizenship goes back to the city states of ancient Greece
3
. Its
modern meaning has been defined as follows by the Encyclopedia Britannica:
“Citizenship is a relationship between an individual and a
state in which an individual owes allegiance to that state
and is in turn entitled to its protection.”
Three aspects of this definition have to be noted:
(a) The actors involved are the citizens and the state. Citizenship is a unique and
monopolistic relationship between the individuals and a particular nation as has
been succinctly summarized by Gordon (1999: 2): “Today, “citizenship” is
defined in terms of a nation, and nationalism is the dominant political sentiment
of our time . . . the hegemonic dominion of the nation is uncontested”.
(b) The citizens have both rights and obligations. The rights refer to:
- the civil sphere, i.e. the citizens are protected against the state by the rule of
law (or Rechtsstaat) and protected when they are abroad, and they may take
up residence within the borders of their state;
- the political sphere, i.e. the citizens, have the right to vote and to hold public
office;
- the social sphere, i.e. the citizens are protected against economic hardship
within the welfare state.
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  See, for instance, the recent books by Kymlicka and Norman 2000, Batstone and Mendieta
1999, Dagger 1997, Galston 1991.
6The obligations consist of military (and increasingly social) service, the
payment of taxes and law-abiding behavior. At least the last two obligations
apply even when a citizen is outwith the borders of his or her own state. Thus,
for example, bribery, or having sex with (consenting) minors, is not tolerated,
even if it is customary in the foreign country a citizen happens to be in. The
citizens also have to accept democratic decisions on a particular matter, even
when they are not in their own best personal interests (see Aristotle, and
Rousseau’s volonté général).
(c) The relationship between an individual and the state goes well beyond an
exchange of taxes for public services. Rather, the citizen “owes allegiance” to
the state. The citizens are expected to be public spirited and to exhibit civic
virtue. The relationship is thus partly non-functional and resorts to the intrinsic
motivation of the citizens
4
 and to the community of people who share loyalty
and identity (Eriksen and Weigard 2000). This aspect will be of crucial
importance in what follows. It distinguishes between the new type of
citizenship proposed here and purely being a customer or member of an
organization.
Most individuals are citizens of one nation. Only exceptionally is it possible to be a
citizen of more than one nation, but most governments strongly discourage or even
forbid it. Some persons feel that they are “citizens of the world”, or at least
“citizens of Europe”, but this is no more than a feeling and is of no legal
consequence.
                                                
4
 These aspects are the subject of a large literature mainly in political science, see e.g.
Mansbridge 1994, Fukuyama 1995, Levi 1997 or Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000. For contributions in
economics, see e.g. Kelman 1987 or Frey 1997a. For law see Cooter (2000). They are also related
to social trust, as discussed e.g. in psychology by Kramer and Tyler 1995, and more generally by
Cook (2001).
7III. GENERALIZED CITIZENSHIP
The existing rigid concept of citizenship can be generalized to include four major
areas:
1. Temporary Citizenship
An individual is able to choose for a predetermined period to become a citizen of a
particular nation, for instance because he or she is working and living in the
respective country for a specific period of time. During that time, his or her main
preoccupation is with the new country, but thereafter it is of little interest.
Therefore, in that particular case it does not make sense to adopt the new
citizenship for good. But such temporary citizenship is not legally possible at the
present time.
2. Multiple Citizenship
For persons simultaneously working and living in various countries, a good
solution might be to divide the citizenship up into various parts. If the time and
intensity of being in one country is approximately the same as in the other, the split
might be fifty-fifty. But if the person mainly lives or works in one country, and is
only occasionally in the other, an 80 percent citizenship in the first, and a 20
percent citizenship in the second, might be in order.
The rights going with the citizenship must be adjusted accordingly. In particular,
the voting rights should reflect the fact that a person chooses to divide citizenship
up over several nations. In the age of computers, there is no problem with allowing
for fractional votes. Thus, if citizenship is divided fifty-fifty between two nations,
the vote should count 0.5 in each country. If the division is 80 to 20, the vote
8should count 0.8 in the first, and 0.2 in the second country. This rule of course
breaks with the time honored principle of “one man, one vote”. But once one has
accepted the possibility of multiple citizenship, it corresponds to the most basic
notion of fairness that the vote is accordingly weighted and not counted fully in
each of the two nations
5
.
3. Partial Citizenship
An individual might be a citizen of a country with respect to one particular
function, while being a citizen of another country with respect to other functions. In
referenda, the voting rights should accordingly only extend to issues referring to the
respective function.
4. Citizenship in Various Types of Organizations
A person may become a citizen of an organization other than the nation. The
following possibilities are conceivable:
(a) Levels of Government
Citizenship might not only refer to the national level – which is the rule – but
also to a lower level, such as the region, province or commune (the latter being
the case in Switzerland) or to a higher level, such as the European Union. This
does not mean, of course, that one can simply opt out and free ride by refusing
to pay taxes while still consuming the public goods offered. But it means that
no special allegiance is owed to the governmental level of which one does not
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 Different degrees of citizenship are also discussed in Mueller 1996, where the author also
distinguishes between a territorial and a cultural citizenship. Tullock 1997 proposes that people
should be allowed to exchange, or trade, citizenship.
 Several concepts of weighted voting have been developed in different contexts in the Public
Choice literature, see e.g. Mueller 1989, 1997.
9wish to be a member. A Catalan, for instance, who refuses to be a citizen of
Spain, is still taxed for those public goods supplied by the Spanish central
government that he or she consumes. But he cannot be forced into helping
finance those expenditures by the Spanish central government devoted to other
purposes e.g. to building roads in other parts of Spain.
(b) Governmental Sub-Organizations
Individuals might choose to become a citizen of only part of a government,
such as the diplomatic service, the military service or the social security
administration. Thus, for example, a person with nationality X may work for,
and become a citizen of, the diplomatic service of country Y. The special rights
and obligations of citizenship would refer to that area only, and not extend
beyond. Thus, the person would have a full vote with respect to the diplomatic
service (he or she would be treated exactly as the traditional citizens of country
Y) while still being an alien with respect to other issues. Historically, many
foreigners were effectively, though not legally, “citizens” of governmental sub-
organizations of another nation, often very successfully. One example is Fürst
Metternich, the foreign minister of the Austrian Empire in the time of the
Congress of Vienna, who was a German. Or another example is the military
leader Prince Eugen of Savoy, who won many battles for Austria even though
he was Italian.
(c) Quasi-Governmental Organizations
There are many organizations close to the public sector where individuals
might become citizens. Universities provide such an example. Indeed, the
institution of “Universitätsbürger” (university citizen) is not uncommon in the
German-speaking academic system. It obviously means much more than just
10
being an ”employee” of a university. Rather, a university citizen is prepared to
commit him- or herself to the academy without considering the short-term
purely personal benefits and costs.
(d) Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs)
Citizenship in the following types of organizations can well be envisaged:
- Churches, for instance the Catholic Church (whose high functionaries have
indeed a citizenship of their own provided by the Vatican State) or religious
orders;
- Clubs, for instance the Rotary Club, the Boy Scouts or even sport clubs such
as Manchester United or FC Barcelona;
- Interest Groups, for instance trade unions and international chambers of
commerce; action groups, such as the World Wildlife Fund; charities such as
the “Médecins sans Frontières” and the Red Cross.
- Functional Organizations, e.g. ICANN, the “Internet Cooperation for
Assigned Names and Numbers”, which is a virtual center of the Internet,
providing web addresses, and the Root Server establishing connections
between the different web sites. ICANN has a virtual citizenry which in 2000
was allowed for the first time to vote for the election of (some of) the
reigning body (see, more generally Engel and Keller 2000). This dimension
of citizenship relates to the concept of Functional, Overlapping, Competing
Jurisdictions (FOCJ)6.
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  Frey and Eichenberger 1999; for a critique Vaubel 2000.
11
- Profit-Oriented Firms. Citizens of firms have a special relationship to their
company, which goes beyond just being a customer or employee. Being a
citizen of a firm is not the same as being a shareholder or a stakeholder.
Shareholders have a decision weight according to the number of shares,
while stakeholders have no formal voting right at all but exert external
pressure, mainly through the media and demonstrations In contrast, each
citizen of a firm has a vote according to generally accepted democratic
principles. Such voting rights are not necessarily incompatible with
shareholders’ voting rights. Firm citizenship can exist very well along with
shareholding
7
.
Management economics has coined the term “corporate citizenship” to indicate an
intrinsically motivated relationship of employees with their firm. The concept has
been generalized to “organizational citizenship”(see e.g. Organ 1990, Van Dyne,
Graham and Dienesch 1994). It includes such behavior as cooperation, supporting
superiors and co-workers, enhancing the reputation of the organization, suggesting
improvements, as well as abstaining from harming the organization e.g. by anti-
social, counterproductive, deviant and maladaptive behavior. There is indeed a
special “psychological” contract (see Rousseau 1995) between the employers and
employees in the organization, which goes beyond short-term egoistic motives.
Individuals might choose to establish citizenship with a national firm (particularly
one in which they work themselves) or with an international firm. An example of
the latter would be citizenship with a credit card firm or with an airline. Such
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  The two voting principles can co-exist perfectly well. This has been demonstrated by the
formal co-determination rights that exist in Germany. In that country, in companies exceeding
2,000 employees, the shareholders and the representatives of the employees hold the same
number of seats in the Aufsichtsrat, the main decision-making body. This arrangement works
quite well and is largely undisputed today.
12
corporations are well equipped to support citizens in their international travels. Not
only can they guarantee the identity of the person, but also his or her financial
status, as certified by travel documents or by computerized means. Moreover, such
firms can arrange work residence and work permits for their citizens with the
various nations. There was indeed a time when American Express actually
performed several of these services for many US citizens abroad, and the same
holds for airlines such as Lufthansa and Swissair. Such firms often have more
resources at their disposal, and are more efficient and flexible, than the traditional
diplomatic service.
IV. THE FUNCTIONING OF THE NEW CITIZENSHIP SYSTEM
“Citizenship: Organizational and Marginal” (COM) is based on voluntary contracts
between the persons aspiring to citizenship of a particular organization and the
organization offering the possibility of citizenship. These contracts are necessarily
incomplete because it is impossible to state all the contingencies that the future
might bring.
An essential feature of citizenship is that an organization can expect a measure of
allegiance and loyalty from its members. Citizens are prepared to abstain from
exploiting in a calculating way all the short-term advantages available.
“Citizenship” means that the members exhibit an intrinsically based motivation to
support “their” organization
8
 in a way that goes beyond purely egoistic
calculations.
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 As President John F. Kennedy said in his inaugural speech: “Ask not what your country does
for you, rather ask what you can do for your country”. But Kennedy restricts such behavior, and
thus citizenship, to the national level. Needless to say, people’s willingness to act in such an
altruistic way towards the state has often been exploited by governments. The First World War
provides a drastic example, and applied to all nations involved in this conflict.
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To envisage such non-selfish behavior would seem to be naive and is indeed at
odds with the basic credo of the rational choice approach (see e.g. Becker 1976,
Lazear 2000, Frey 1999) as well as with the traditionally conceived “Law and
Economics” (e.g. Posner 1986, Hirsch 1976; in contrast to Cooter 1984 and Cooter
and Ulen 2000). While these approaches have been most successful, they have
overlooked aspects not captured by egoistic benefit-cost calculations.
Over the last few years, theoretical and empirical research has made considerable
progress. We now have strong and cumulative empirical evidence that under many
conditions individuals are prepared to contribute substantially to what they consider
the common good even if it is not in their individual egoistic interests to do so. Free
riding in the presence of public goods (as analyzed by Olson 1965) remains a
serious problem, especially when people feel that others do not contribute their fair
share, or when the situation is purely anonymous and the possible gain is all too
large. But extensive field studies
9
 confirm that incentives to free ride need not
dictate behavior, especially when the persons know, and communicate with, each
other. There is similar evidence from a large number of carefully controlled
laboratory experiments
10
. No less than 40 to 60 percent of subjects in a one-shot
public good situation contribute to the provision of a pure public good. The level of
cooperation remains between 30 and 50 percent of what would be socially optimal,
even after many repetitions (e.g. Dawes, McTavish and Shaklee 1977, Ledyard
1995, Bohnet and Frey 1997, 1999). But such cooperation is not naive; in many
situations people contribute to a common good only if people in the reference
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 (See, in particular Ostrom 1990, 2000a,b, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker 1994.
10
 (See, for instance, Bowles 1998, Fehr and Schmidt 1999, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Bowles and
Gintis 2001.
14
group do likewise
11
. This type of conditional cooperation is supported and
enhanced by the institution of generalized citizenship. The voluntary citizenship
contract establishes formal rules applying to every citizen, which serves to prevent
unfair behavior.
These insights link up with the rapidly growing research pointing out the
importance of social capital for individuals’ behavior in the political and general
social setting (Putnam 1993, 2000, Coleman 1990). There is now a wide consensus
among social scientists that intrinsic motivation, loyalty, or social capital, is an
indispensable resource for a well functioning society
12
. When it is insufficiently
developed, or scarcely exists, society threatens to break down or at least functions
at a low level of efficiency. Thus care must be taken to protect it. It has indeed been
shown in experiments (Deci and Ryan 1985, Deci, Koestner and Ryan 1999), as
well as in field research (Frey 1997b, Frey and Jegen 2001), that external
interventions, which are taken to be controlling by the persons affected, may crowd
out intrinsic motivation.
Citizenship thus does not only rely on a measure of civic virtue but also serves to
strengthen such intrinsic motivation. The citizenship contract is based on a mutual
belief in good intentions. The leaders of the organization expect their citizens to
exhibit allegiance and loyalty, and conversely the citizens expect the organization
to put its trust in them. As a result, civic virtue tends to be supported or crowded in.
A voluntary citizenship contract constitutes a formal acknowledgment that a special
relationship exists between the individual and the organization beyond a purely
selfish benefit-cost calculation. More deeply underlying intrinsic values, as well as
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 For experimental evidence on conditional cooperation and reciprocity see, for instance, Keser
and van Winden 2000, Fehr and Gächter 2000. The theoretical background has been explored by
e.g. Sugden 1982, Rabin 1993.
12
 One may add that this also holds for relationships within firms, see Osterloh and Frey 2000.
15
emotions13, are involved. Citizenship cannot be divorced from such “hot” factors.
This element distinguishes citizenship fundamentally from a traditional producer-
customer relationship.
The citizenship contract specifies the rules governing the relationship and the
mutual obligations. This includes the taxes to be paid by the citizens in return for
the public services rendered, as well as the political participation rights of the
citizens, e.g. the right to elect the organization’s directors and to initiate citizens’
initiatives and referenda. The larger the pure public good part of the public activity
provided by an organization, the more intensively political participation rights will
be sought by the citizens. It is to be expected that the most intensive participation
will be sought in the case of governmental organizations, as the very raison d’être
of the state lies in the provision of public goods (see e.g. Mueller 1989). But it is
equally clear that it is not only governments which supply goods and services with
public good characteristics, but many other organizations too – including (of course
to a more limited extent) profit-oriented firms
14
.
The contracts are public in the sense that a citizen cannot contract for any
individual service, as would be possible on a market. Rather, a citizen could
participate in the consumption of the pure or impure public goods supplied by the
organization of which he or she is a member. COM thus refers to “club”- goods in
the sense of Buchanan (1965), where non-members can be excluded but where the
consumption among the citizens has public good characteristics. But Buchanan’s
analysis only looks at the benefits and costs an additional member creates, while he
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  Emotions, or visceral factors, are a topic economists have only most recently become aware of
( e.g. Frank 1988, Loewenstein 2000, Akerlof and Kranton 2000).
14
  The vanishing borders between “private” and “public” are discussed, e.g. in Weisbrod 2000, in
the case of charitable, cultural and health organizations.
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neglects what has been stressed above, namely the special relationship between the
members and their club based on intrinsic motivations such as trust and loyalty.
The citizenship contract has a public component in that entry and exit are guided by
formal rules. These rules serve to prevent unfair discrimination between individuals
and lower transaction costs. A person meeting the requirements for being a citizen
of an organization must be admitted, and he or she is permitted to exit when the
general conditions applying to all the citizens are met. An organization can apply
specific conditions for citizenship in a similar way to what nations do nowadays.
But it can use innovative ideas to do so. For instance, persons wanting to work in a
specific region may be able to offer money for this privilege instead of having to
depend on a haphazard bureaucratic or random system. Exit also depends on
conditions mostly relating to the past consumption of publicly supplied goods.
Thus, a person who received a heavy subsidy, or even an essentially free education,
can be asked to pay back the corresponding amount if he or she wants to exit the
organization.
V. ADVANTAGES OF THE NEW CONCEPT OF CITIZENSHIP
A. Opening Up More Flexible Solutions
The existing concept of citizenship, with its principle of immutable, monopolistic
and lifelong attachment to one nation, in many respects does not fit the
requirements of persons acting in a global society. This holds in particular for
internationally highly mobile persons, such as managers of global firms (e.g. of
IBM or ABB), sportsmen and sportswomen (e.g. Formula 1 racing drivers or top
tennis players), artists (e.g. opera singers or conductors) or scientists teaching at
several universities across the world. The traditional nationality concept is also
17
inadequate for some ethnic groups such as the Sinti and Roma, whose nomadic life
style is inconsistent with being citizens of one particular nation.
The concept COM opens up several possibilities for making citizenship more
flexible:
(a) temporary citizenship according to the period of time spent with a particular
organization;
(b) multiple citizenship according to the amoung of time spent with each
organization;
(c) partial citizenship according to functions, e.g. with respect to international
travel with a global firm (say, American Express) and with respect to state old
age pensions with the social security system of some country.
B. Allowing Multiple Identifications
In the 19
th
 and the first part of the 20
th
 century, the major focus of identification for
many people may have been the nation. But even today the idea of one single,
deeply ingrained national identity still survives. According to COM, a person it not
limited to belonging to only one nation, religion or ethnicity. Rather, today’s world
is characterized by belonging to many different entities at the same time: a person
may well be a Swiss, a catholic, an academic, an adherent of a sports club, as well
as being a member of a charitable organization. As so often happens, novelists have
grasped the essential point in a convincing way. Amin Maalouf in his book “Les
identités meurtrières” (1998) writes:
“I do not possess several identities, I possess only one identity,
comprising all the elements which have gone into its formation, creating
18
that unique “mixture” which differentiates one person from another.”
(p.7-8, my translation).
Maalouf was born a Lebanese and has been living in France for 22 years. He writes
in French but his mother tongue is Arabic, the holy language of Islam; he
nevertheless is a Christian but not a Roman-Catholic.
The change from a national citizenship to one composed of many different
components has so far not been acknowledged; the concept of citizenship has
remained unchanged throughout the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century. But today many people
feel close to several countries and to other types of organizations and not solely to
one nation and one nation only. Especially among the younger generations, the
sense of an exclusive national identification has appreciably declined.
The concept of COM allows individuals to become citizens of organizations they
strongly identify with. They are therefore willing to engage in a relationship in
which they not only have rights but also obligations (going beyond the payment of
taxes). The following are some examples of non-national citizenship:
(a) A person might identify with a lower level than the national level, in particular
a regional level. Pertinent examples are certain people from Catalunya who are
strongly attached to their language and culture, but do not wish to be nationals
of Spain (or of any other nation for that matter). Some individuals might even
identify more with their city or commune than with any other governmental
level. Accordingly, it makes sense that they are able to fulfil their preferences
by becoming citizens of the corresponding local jurisdiction.
(b) A person’s identification might be with a higher level of government. There are
people who feel that they are no longer citizens of their nation, but citizens of
Europe or of NATO. The concept of COM would allow them to opt for this
19
kind of citizenship without having to wait for a fully-fledged “State of
Europe”(which will perhaps never happen). In contrast, those persons who are
less taken with the European unification process could keep their national
citizenship.
(c) Many academics today have much closer relationships with their peers at
universities located in other, often far away, countries than with other persons
in the country where they live and work. They might become citizens of their
own university or of university systems extending across various nations.
(d) Many individuals closely identify with their religious denomination. The
example of the Catholic Church has already been mentioned. Such persons
should be able to become citizens of their church; they are prepared to accept
the corresponding mutual rights and obligations. Citizenship could also be
envisaged for a part of a church. To stay with the example of the Catholic
Church: a Cistercian monk, for example, has devoted his life to Christ,
represented on earth by his order. He is truly a citizen of the Cistercian order.
The traditional concept of citizenship forces him instead to be a citizen of a
particular nation, with which he has no practical or spiritual connection.
(e) Sport addicts often identify with “their” club. Pertinent examples are European
football clubs. Such persons should have the possibility of becoming citizens
of, say, Manchester United or FC Barcelona. As in many previous examples,
there is no relationship to a nation. In the case of FC Barcelona, there was the
situation recently that eight of the eleven top players, as well as the coach, had
Dutch nationality. With citizenship, the persons, as well as the clubs, assume
rights and obligations. The establishment of citizenship would help to tackle the
problem of hooliganism. Today, the clubs are held responsible for any damage
done by their fans, even outside of the stadium. It is unclear on what basis the
20
clubs are held responsible, because they do not have any formal relationship
with the supporters other than selling them an entry ticket to a game. With
COM, the relationship between fans and clubs would be intensified and
formalized, and the clubs could therefore require their citizens to behave in an
appropriate way.
(f) Many persons feel closely related to an action group in which they (often
voluntarily) work and to which they contribute money. The individuals active
in “Médecins sans Frontières” and in the Red Cross make a distinct effort to
disassociate themselves from any particular nation in order to be able to
efficiently carry out their noble tasks. For such persons, it would be
advantageous to become a citizen of these organizations (possibly for a
restricted time period) rather than to have to hide their nationality. The Red
Cross has actually split over this issue. The League of Red Cross Associations
is comprised of nationally oriented sections, which tend to concentrate on
national tasks, and principally care for the wounded and POWs of their own
country, which is scarcely compatible with Dunant’s fundamental idea of the
Red Cross. The International Committee of the Red Cross endeavors to correct
this shortcoming by spanning all countries. In an effort to overcome conflicting
national interests, it has been ruled that the members of the ruling body, the
Committee, are solely composed of citizens of a neutral country, Switzerland,
because of it being a neutral country. This construction is well suited to harness
the strife between nations, but one nation is exclusively favored. While this
solution is probably better than having all nations lobbying and using bullying
tactics to get seats on the Committee, COM offers a better alternative. The
members of the Committee, who must be supposed to be fully engaged in their
task, should adopt the citizenship of the Red Cross.
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(g) In internationally oriented firms, the nationality of the top managers, as well as
of many of the employees, has become irrelevant. An example is the chemical
company Roche, whose eight member executive board is composed of
managers of six nationalities, five of whom (also) have Swiss nationality. As
nationality is largely irrelevant, and these managers in the course of their
careers have worked in many different countries, citizenship with the firm
would present an attractive alternative to the present national citizenship.
C. Fostering the Willingness to Contribute to Public Goods
The loyalty, commitment and engagement supported and enhanced by establishing
citizenship connections strengthen individuals’ willingness to voluntarily contribute
to the financing of publicly provided goods and services. It would, of course, be
naive to assume that taxes are paid voluntarily. On the other hand, research by
economists
15
 has established beyond doubt that tax paying behavior cannot be
explained by the government exerting force. Indeed, “A purely economic analysis
of the evasion gamble implies that most individuals would evade if they are
“rational”, because it is unlikely that cheaters will be caught and penalized” (Alm,
McClelland and Schulze 1992: 22). But most people, more than 95 percent,
actually pay the taxes due.
Neither of the extreme positions is realistic: people do not pay taxes voluntarily,
nor do they do so only because they are forced to. What matters is that the civic
virtue increased by citizenship tends to significantly raise people’s willingness to
financially contribute to public activities. Being categorized as a citizen produces a
feeling of identity, which in turn acts as a constraint on behavior. Due to this
identification, citizens are less prone to exploiting other people by acting as free-
                                                
15
  See the surveys by Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998 and Slemrod 1992, as well as the
studies by Graetz and Wilde 1985, Skinner and Slemrod 1985, Frey 1997c.
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riders. Identity does not only act as a constraint on choice but induces people to
refrain from a conscious calculus of choice (Monroe 2001, Monroe, Hankin and
VanVechten 2000, Tajfel 1970). This facilitates the supply of the respective goods
and services in a global environment, where the use of force by organizations and
governments is severely limited as no world government with a monopoly of power
exists.
D. Better Preference Fulfillment
COM allows individuals a broader choice. Citizenship would no longer be
restricted to nations, and would not be imposed at birth. Rather, individuals would
have the possibility of selecting whatever form of citizenship they find most
advantageous in their own lives. This choice is not one-sided. The organizations
offering citizenship would impose membership conditions. In particular, they
would stipulate the obligations, such as a specific degree of commitment.
Individuals would be better able to find a citizenship arrangement suitable for them.
They can enter a public contract where their likes and dislikes are taken into
account. The case of a strong supporter of European integration, who can
personally choose to become a citizen of Europe, or the members of a certain
ethnicity, who want to associate themselves with their region and opt out of their
nation, have already been mentioned. And persons who dislike the nation as an
institution could become citizens of non-national organizations, such as NGOs or
global firms.
E. Higher Efficiency of Public Activities
Following COM, the state loses the monopoly over a considerable set of activities
traditionally considered to be the realm of the government. The nation is exposed to
competition from lower and higher levels of government, foreign nations, as well
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as NGOs and profit-oriented firms. As a result of this larger opportunity set, exit
would be facilitated, and all the organizations supplying citizenship would be
induced to offer attractive conditions. This contrasts strongly with today’s national
monopoly, where an individual has a high price to pay when deciding to exit.
Efficiency is also increased by the fact that citizenship could flexibly be adjusted to
meet the present and still unknown future demand for publicly provided goods and
services.
VI. CLAIMED DISADVANTAGES
As is always the case with an unconventional idea, many arguments may be raised
against the new concept of citizenship. The following four seem to be particularly
important.
1. Citizenship is not needed.
It could be argued that the concept of citizenship is unnecessary, because an
individual can get all the services on the market by private contract.
This argument does not hold, as many of the goods provided by governmental and
non-governmental organizations to some extent have public good characteristics,
for which - due to free riding incentives – private provision does not function
sufficiently well. Moreover, citizenship entails more than just buying a good or a
service. Citizens must be prepared to commit themselves to the organization. They
cannot behave in a purely selfish way and be solely extrinsically motivated. Rather,
they must be prepared to abstain from short-term opportunistic behavior; they must
to some extent be intrinsically motivated. Only then will public activity of
sufficient quantity and quality be forthcoming. The experience of the transition
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economies has made perfectly clear that behavior based on civic virtue is required,
and that markets cannot substitute for everything.
2. The new concept of citizenship has high transaction costs.
It might be argued that the transaction costs for the individuals would increase to
too high levels when they could choose between many different suppliers of
citizenship.
It is certainly true that COM enlarges the possibility set, and in this sense
complicates the world. But the extended possibilities of choice simply reflect a
more complex global world. While COM introduces some new evaluation and
decision costs, it should not be overlooked that the present monopolistic supply of
citizenship also imposes costs: the choice set of individuals is strongly limited by
restricting citizenship to one single nation. With increasing globalization and
enlarged opportunities, these costs tend to rise sharply.
3. The new system of citizenship is infeasible.
It may be argued that making citizenship more flexible “does not work in reality”.
However, in many important respects, aspects of COM are already in existence.
Some examples are:
(a) Multiple national citizenship exists to a limited extent. But, more importantly,
the citizens of federal states are in actual fact, though not always legally,
already members of several (governmental) organizations.
(b) In several countries, foreigners have voting rights at the local level. Thus, the
citizens of an EU-nation have the right to vote in the local elections of another
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EU-country in which they reside (Article 19 (8b) ECT). In this sense, multiple
and partial citizenship already exists
16
.
(c) Diplomats have an international status which could be called “citizenship in the
diplomatic service”, providing them with a number of goods with public good
characteristics. A case is immunity, which could not be bought on the market.
Similarly, the World Bank already issues passports to its employees, with which
they are able to travel worldwide
17
.
(d) The top persons in the Catholic Church, the Pope, the Cardinals and other
clerics active in the central administration, have a citizenship of their own,
vested in the minute Vatican State.
(e) People are “citizens” of condominiums in many urban settings. In Seoul, for
example, a very large proportion of the residents of the city live in relatively
large-scale condominiums. Each such resident belongs to a floor organization, a
building organization and to an overall condominium organization. This federal
system may involve as many as 10,000-20,000 people, who must pay a monthly
fee in order to stay in the condominium. Some of these condominiums hire as
many as 200-500 staff members, who provide a variety of social services such
as day-care and recreation. Each “citizen” is required to pay what might be
considered taxes to provide a variety of public goods for the condominium. It is
almost impossible to tell the difference between some of these condominiums
and what is called local government in other settings
18
.
                                                
16
 Already in ancient Rome there was “full” and “partial” citizenship. The latter had the same
legal status as the former in all private matters, but they could not vote in the assemblies or stand
for office ( see e.g. Gordon 1999: 93).
17
  Personal communication by Dennis Mueller, 25 September 2000.
18
  Personal communication by Elinor Ostrom, 2 October 2000.
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The COM-system would not require a sudden institutional change. It could be
introduced in small steps. The first individuals who would probably take advantage
of the new type of citizenship are the internationally highly mobile managers,
sports people, artists and academics. Persons satisfied with their present national
citizenship would not have to take any action.
4. The new system of citizenship will be politically opposed.
Without any doubt, the politicians presently in charge are strongly motivated to
reject flexible citizenship because it would rob or undermine their monopoly
power. The same holds for public officials who benefit from the fact that, in many
respects, the citizens do not have any alternatives. For example, what can a national
citizen do if the public bureaucracy refuses to issue a passport? In many nations,
recourse to courts is slow, costly in terms of time and money, or simply ineffective.
COM is not acceptable by persons who, as a matter of principle, want to restrict the
term “citizen” to the traditional meaning. It will certainly be difficult for many to
consider modifying such a time-honored concept. The same holds for “marketeers”,
who want to improve the world by expanding the realm of the price system by
pushing back the state.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Citizenship entails a special relationship, consisting both of rights and obligations
going far beyond short-term and egoistic exchanges between individuals and the
state. The concept of citizenship has traditionally been reserved exclusively for the
nation state. But states have proved to be unable to meet the challenges of a global
world. The existing state monopoly of citizenship is too narrow and inefficient and
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conflicts with the tasks to be solved by public activities. Citizenship, with its rights
and obligations, can be generalized and made more flexible. Temporary, multiple
and partial citizenship may be extended to quasi-governmental and non-
governmental organizations, including churches, clubs, interest groups, functional
organizations and profit-oriented firms. Indeed, the notion of academic, corporate,
organizational, industrial and functional citizenship can be observed in one form or
another in reality. To extend citizenship to organizations beyond the nation
increases the choice set of individuals; raises the willingness to finance publicly
provided goods and services in the global economy; leads to better preference
fulfillment, establishes more intensive competition between the many organizations
able to provide public activities, and therewith raises efficiency.
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